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NOTE
DUCKWORTH v. EAGAN: A SEMANTICAL
DEBATE OR THE CONTINUING
DEBASEMENT OF MIRANDA?
The United States Constitution affords a criminal defendant the opportu-
nity to be represented by counsel under certain circumstances. In particular,
the sixth amendment provides a defendant the right to counsel in criminal
prosecutions.1 Additionally, the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment provides that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."2 While this clause does not directly guaran-
tee a criminal defendant the right to counsel, the United States Supreme
Court interprets the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment to af-
ford an accused a limited right to counsel prior to and during police
interrogation.3
In Miranda v. Arizona,4 the United States Supreme Court held that, prior
to questioning, the police must warn an accused of the right to remain silent
and the right to consult with an attorney prior to and during interrogation,
and that, absent a voluntary and knowing waiver of those rights, any state-
ment made by the accused cannot be used by the prosecution.' While prof-
fering a standard set of warnings to be used by law enforcement officers
during custodial interrogation,6 the Miranda Court indicated that a "fully
effective equivalent"7 of the enunciated warnings would satisfy fifth amend-
ment requirements. Since Miranda, courts have been receptive to warnings
that deviate from the explicit language of Miranda, but are in disagreement
1. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see infra notes 62-72 and accompa-
nying text.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. "[When an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Id. at 479.
6. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. The Court stated that "[t]he warnings required... are, in
the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissability of any statement
made by a defendant." Id. (emphasis added).
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as to what constitutes a fully effective equivalent of Miranda warnings.' In
particular, advisements that indicate that counsel will not be appointed until
some point after an accused's questioning have generated substantial confu-
sion among federal and state courts.9
In Duckworth v. Eagan, " the Court considered what form Miranda warn-
ings should take, but did little to clarify the confusion. Rather, the Court
held that Miranda is satisfied when pre-interrogation warnings, in their to-
tality, "reasonably convey" to a suspect the right against self-incrimina-
tion." In Duckworth, Gary James Eagan was a suspect in a rape and
stabbing.' 2 Prior to questioning, the police had Eagan sign a voluntary
waiver form. 3 The form provided that prior to and during questioning,
Eagan had the right to the presence of an attorney. 4 Nevertheless, a later
provision in the waiver added: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but
one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court."' 5
Eagan initially gave an exculpatory explanation of his actions, but later, after
executing a second waiver of his rights, confessed to the stabbing' 6
The trial court admitted both of Eagan's statements, and a jury convicted
him of attempted murder.'7 The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the
conviction.'" The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana denied Eagan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on an appeal from the de-
nial of a writ of habeas corpus, reversed the District Court decision and
remanded the case.2° Specifically, a majority of the divided panel found the
first Miranda warning given to Eagan, containing the ambiguous "if and
when" language, violative of Miranda. 2 The dissenting judge found the ma-
jority's approach an overly technical application of Miranda.22 The United
8. See infra notes 90-125 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 110-40 and accompanying text.
10. 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
11. Id. at 2880 (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981)).
12. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2877.
13. See infra note 147.
14. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2877.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 2877-78.
17. See Eagan v. State, 480 N.E.2d 946 (Ind. 1985).
18. Id.
19. See Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2875.
20. Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
21. Id. at 1557-58. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether
Eagan executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to an attorney during the second
interrogation. Id.
22. Id. at 1558 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (citing United States ex reL. Williams v. Twomey,
467 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1972) (Pell, J., dissenting)).
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether "if and when you
go to court" language renders Miranda warnings inadequate. 3
The Supreme Court, holding the warnings sufficient, reversed the Seventh
Circuit's decision.24 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,25
found that Eagan's initial waiver form "touched all of the bases required by
Miranda."2 6 The Court explained that the "if and when you go to court"
language simply anticipates a commonplace question which suspects ask re-
garding when they will be able to obtain appointed counsel.2 ' The Chief
Justice concluded that, in their totality, the warnings sufficed because they
did not link the right to counsel with an event that would occur after ques-
tioning and because they "reasonably conveyed" to Eagan his rights under
Miranda.2"
In a strong dissent, Justice Marshall rejected the contention that pre-inter-
rogation warnings need only "'touc[h] all of the bases required by Mi-
randa' "29 and instead focused on whether the warnings "clearly informed"
Eagan of his rights.3" The dissent asserted that an "if and when you go to
court" caveat could not clearly inform a suspect of his right to appointed
counsel prior to and during interrogation.31 Rather, such language leads a
suspect to believe that an attorney will not be provided until some indeter-
minable time after questioning.32 Moreover, Justice Marshall chided the
majority for not adequately protecting the rights of the indigent, the people
most frequently subjected to custodial interrogation. 33 Labeling the major-
ity's holding a "mockery" of the Miranda decision, the dissent stated that it
refused to concur in the "continuing debasement of this historic
precedent."34
This Note first reviews the limited rights afforded an accused prior to the
Supreme Court's Miranda decision, and the case-by-case approach used by
reviewing courts to test the voluntariness of statements made during interro-
gation. This Note then examines the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda,
23. Duckworth v. Eagan, 488 U.S. 888 (1988).
24. Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1989). The Court was divided with five
Justices joining in the majority opinion, and four Justices dissenting. Id. at 2878.
25. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
26. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
27.. Id. The majority also noted that the waiver "accurately described the procedure for
the appointment of counsel in Indiana." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2880 (majority opinion)).
30. Id. at 2886 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 479 (1966)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id at 2886-87; see infra note 190.
34. Id. at 2886; see infra note 181.
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focusing on the Court's creation of a limited right to counsel under the self-
incrimination clause of the fifth amendment and the Court's rejection of a
case-by-case analysis of the admissibility of custodial confessions. Next, this
Note scrutinizes Supreme Court and lower court decisions interpreting the
Miranda Court's requirement that suspects be informed of the right to ap-
pointed counsel prior to and during custodial questioning. Specifically, this
Note examines judicial treatment of Miranda warnings that condition the
right to counsel on a suspect's appearance in court. This Note then reviews
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Duckworth v. Eagan.
This Note observes that the Court could remedy the problem highlighted in
Duckworth, namely, ambiguously worded pre-interrogation warnings, by en-
dorsing specific Miranda language for all pre-interrogation warning and
waiver forms. This Note suggests that if the Court is not satisfied with Mi-
randa's requirements, it should explicitly overrule Miranda and announce
specific warnings that, in the Court's mind, strike an appropriate balance
between effective police interrogation and a suspect's right against self-in-
crimination. This Note concludes that the Duckworth Court misread or in-
tentionally disregarded Miranda, and predicts that other ambiguously
worded pre-interrogation warnings will create confusion for reviewing
courts, resulting in inconsistent application of the Miranda rule.
I. THE ORIGINS OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
3 5
A. The Due Process Approach
In Brown v. Mississippi, 36 the United States Supreme Court held that con-
fessions compelled through physical beatings were "revolting to the sense of
justice"37 and, therefore, invalid under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 38 In Brown, three black males were beaten and whipped
by a deputy sheriff and a group of white men until they confessed to murder-
35. See generally W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch.6 (Student ed. 1985) (historical
background on interrogation and confessions); D. NISSMAN, LAW OF CONFESSIONS (1985) (in-
depth discussion of the principles surrounding the development of confessions law); Note,
Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping Backwards to Pre-Miranda Days?, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 245
(1985) (discussion of pre-Miranda case law and the coerced confession doctrine); Comment,
Criminal Law: The Accused's Right to Miranda Warnings-or Their Functional Equivalent 21
WASHBURN L.J. 427 (1982) (overview of case law interpreting the accused's right against self-
incrimination),
36. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). For an analysis of case law regarding the admissibility of confes-
sions prior to Brown, see Lippman, Miranda v. Arizona: TWenty Years Later, 9 CRIM. JUST. J.
241-45 (1987).
37. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
38. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
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ing a white farmer.39 Apart from the confessions, there was no evidence of
the suspects' participation in the murder." The trial court found the three
men guilty of murder and sentenced them to death.4" The Supreme Court of
Mississippi affirmed the death sentence,42 but, upon a writ of certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court set aside the convictions.4 3 The Court deter-
mined that the convictions, secured solely by the heinous activity of the tor-
turers, were violative of due process."
Shortly after Brown, the Court held confessions elicited through psycho-
logical coercion equally violative of due process.45 In Chambers v. Florida,46
the police took between twenty-five and forty blacks into custody, accusing
them of robbing and murdering an elderly white man.47 The suspects were
taken to a prison and repeatedly questioned by the sheriff and a prison
guard.48 After a week of interrogation, during which the suspects were de-
nied visits by counsel, family, and friends, one of the suspects "confessed" to
the crime.49 The prosecution used this statement to convict the suspects of
the offense and the prisoners were sentenced to death. The United States
Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, noted that excessive psychological
pressure, in the form of protracted questioning and cross-examination, was
coercive.51 Thus, the Court determined that statements made subject to
those conditions were invalid under the fourteenth amendment.52
39. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-83.
40. Id. at 279.
41. Id.
42. Brown v. State, 173 Miss. 542, 560, 158 So. 339, 343 (1935).
43. Brown, 297 U.S. at 287.
44. Id.
45. See Tinsely, Involuntary Confessions: Psychological Coercion, 22 Proof of Facts 2d.
539, 547-48 (Am. Jur. 1980).
[T]here is no clear definition as to what is meant by psychological coercion.
Although it has been suggested that the Supreme Court, in condemning psychologi-
cal coercion, probably has had reference to manipulation of a suspect's emotional
condition, as contrasted to the use of physical force, there is in fact no easy method
for determining the point of delineation between psychological and physical coer-
cion .... [G]enerally, the concept of psychological coercion encompasses any at-
tempt to obtain a statement from a suspect by the use of coercive measures short of
actual physical force or violence.
Id. (footnote omitted).
46. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
47. Id at 230-35.
48. Id.
49. Id. The interrogation included at least one all-night questioning session. Id at 231.
50. Id. at 235.
51. Id. at 239-40.
52. Id at 24041.
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B. The Voluntariness Approach
Following Chambers, courts employed a coerced confession doctrine, 3
and reviewed custodial confessions on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a statement was volun-
tary.54 In determining voluntariness, courts applied a subjective test, taking
into account such factors as the length and intensity of police interrogations,
the nature and amount of any inducement,55 and the individual's age, intelli-
gence, education, and prior experience in dealing with law enforcement
officers.56
The Supreme Court's decision in Ashcraft v. Tennessee57 illustrates a sub-
jective approach to a determination of voluntariness. Ashcraft was arrested
and accused of being an accessory in the murder of his wife. 58 For thirty-six
hours, police refused to allow Ashcraft to make contact outside the police
station, while allowing him no sleep or rest, questioning him without res-
pite. 59 While it was uncertain whether Ashcraft actually made an incrimi-
nating statement, the Court held that any confession made under such
53. See Note, supra note 35, at 249-52.
54. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961):
No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation has been
evolved ....
... The ultimate test remains... the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he
has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process.
Id. at 601-02 (citations omitted); see also Pilou, Miranda and Escobedo: Warren v. Burger
Court Decisions on 5th Amendment Rights, 4 S.U.L. REV. 175, 177 (1978); Lippman, supra
note 36, at 249-52.
55. See generally Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963) (defendant was held for
16 hours and told that he could not contact his wife or an attorney until he "cooperated" with
the police by confessing to participation in a robbery). See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Lisenba
v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
56. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). The Court stated:
The totality approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the [accused's]
age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the
capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.
Id. at 725; see also Tinsely, Involuntary Confessions: Psychological Coercion, 22 Proof of Facts
2d. 539, 548-51 (Am. Jur. 1980).
57. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
58. Id at 144.
59. Id. at 153. Indeed, "[t]estimony of the officers shows that the reason they questioned
Ashcraft 'in relays' was that they became so tired they were compelled to rest." Id. at 149.
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inherently coercive circumstances was not voluntary, but compelled.'
Thus, because of the coercive nature of involuntary confessions, the Supreme
Court, in Brown and its progeny, deemed such statements inadmissible at
trial.6
1
C. The Sixth Amendment Approach
In Escobedo v. Illinois,62 the Supreme Court moved away from reviewing
the admission of confessions according to the voluntariness test and due pro-
cess standards, focusing instead on an individual's sixth amendment right to
counsel during interrogation.6 3 In Escobedo, police arrested the defendant
and brought him to the police station for questioning concerning the murder
of his brother-in-law. 6" The police did not advise Escobedo of his right to
remain silent or his right to consult with an attorney. 65 During interroga-
tion, Escobedo asked to see his attorney, who was in the building.66 The
police, however, falsely told Escobedo that his attorney did not want to see
him.67 Subsequently, Escobedo made an incriminating statement to the po-
lice which was used to convict him at trial.68
In overturning Escobedo's conviction, the Supreme Court held that when
a police investigation begins to focus on a particular suspect, and that sus-
pect, after being taken into custody, has not been afforded an opportunity to
consult with an attorney, any custodial questioning of the suspect is violative
of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel.69 The Court reasoned
60. Id. at 153; see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S.
528 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
61. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)("ours is an accusatorial and
not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence inde-
pendently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out
of his own mouth").
62. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
63. Id. at 490-91. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Five weeks before Escobedo, the Supreme Court decided Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964), which held that the right to counsel attaches at the post-indictment stage
of a criminal proceeding. Id.
64. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479.
65. Id. at 483.
66. Id. at 481.
67. Id. Indeed, Escobedo's attorney made repeated attempts to see his client but was
refused. At one point, Escobedo and his attorney came into view of one another, but were
denied an opportunity to consult. Id. at 480-81.
68. Id. at 483. When confronted by another suspect in the murder, Escobedo exclaimed,
in the presence of the police, "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it." Id.
69. Id. at 490-91. The Court, however, limited its holding to the circumstances of the
case. Id at 492.
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that Escobedo had become the accused in the murder investigation, and that
the underlying purpose of the police interrogation was to compel Escobedo
to admit his guilt.7° Further, the Court noted that because the police did not
inform Escobedo of his right to remain silent, the police implicitly urged him
to make an involuntary statement. 71 Recognizing that Escobedo's question-
ing constituted a critical stage in the criminal process, the Court asserted
that legal advice was essential to ensure that Escobedo was aware of his
rights. 72 The Court, therefore, held any statement elicited from the accused
while in police custody, without a warning of the right to counsel and the
right to remain silent, inadmissible at trial. a Significantly, the Escobedo
Court extended the right to counsel to the pre-indictment stage of criminal
proceedings.74
II. MIRANDA CHANGES THE RULES REGARDING CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION
Noting inconsistent application of the Escobedo principle, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miranda v. Arizona.75 In Mi-
randa,76 the police arrested Miranda and others and took them into police
70. Id. at 485. The Court concluded:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of crimi-
nal law enforcement which comes to depend upon the "confession" will, in the long
run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on
extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.
Id. at 488-89 (footnotes omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 486.
73. Id. at 490-91.
74. Id. at 485. The Court, however, qualified its holding.
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when
its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary
system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be
permitted to consult with his lawyer.
Id at 492. Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, argued that: "By
abandoning the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility of confessions, the Court seems
driven by the notion that it is uncivilized law enforcement to use an accused's own admissions
against him at his trial." Id. at 496 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent therefore concluded
that the Court's decision is "another major step in the direction of the goal ... to bar from
evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily
made or not." Id. at 495 (White, J., dissenting).
75. 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966). Compare United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966) (the right to an attorney does not attach until the
accused requests one) with Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1965) (whether the accused
requests an attorney is irrelevant, the right still exists).
76. In addition to Miranda v. Arizona, the Court decided Vignera v. New York, on certio-
rari to the Court of Appeals of New York; Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; and California v. Stewart, on certiorari
1274 [Vol. 39:1267
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custody without warning them of their right to remain silent or their right to
consult with an attorney."' All four defendants made incriminating state-
ments during police interrogations. These statements were subsequently
used against the defendants at trial.7 ' The Supreme Court held that the po-
lice obtained the defendants' statements under conditions that violated the
defendants' fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.79
In arriving at its decision, the Court highlighted several cases where over-
bearing police practices resulted in involuntary confessions.80 In addition,
the Court stressed that modern police interrogation focused on psychologi-
cal intimidation of the accused."1 The Court found that psychologically co-
ercive police procedures, gathered from various police manuals and texts,
8 2
undermined an individual's will to remain silent and compelled that individ-
ual to speak.13 To overcome these pressures, and to secure freedom against
self-incrimination, the Court required that the police employ certain safe-
guards, or their "fully effective equivalent," 4 when questioning a defendant
to the Supreme Court of California. The Court noted that in all four cases there was interroga-
tion in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-58.
77. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440.
78. Id. All four defendants made oral admissions, and three of the four also signed state-
ments admitting guilt. Id.
79. Id. at 491. Five justices joined in the majority opinion.
80. Id. at 445-46 (citing Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Canty
v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
81. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448; see Edwards, An Opportunity for Upgrading Police Stan-
dards, in A NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDo-THE SECOND ROUND 52-55 (George
ed. 1967) (discussing psychological coercion techniques).
82. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55.
83. Id at 467.
From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting pre-
scribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this:
To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of
any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist.
He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe.
Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a
confession, the interrogat6r must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a
position from which the desired objective may be attained." When normal proce-
dures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems
such as giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for
example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police
then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
84. Id at 476. The Court invited Congress or the States to search for other "effective
ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
Catholic University Law Review
while in custody. The specific safeguards enunciated by the Court required
that a suspect
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.8 5
The Miranda Court indicated that the accused must be afforded these rights
throughout interrogation, and that only upon a voluntary, knowing, and in-
telligent waiver does he relinquish these rights.16 Thus, the Court imposed a
heavy burden upon the prosecution to demonstrate that the accused exe-
cuted such a waiver before a solicited statement becomes admissible at
trial.8 7
By establishing concrete constitutional protections for the accused during
custodial interrogation, the Miranda Court sought to provide a "bright line"
rule for testing the voluntariness of confessions."8 The Court anticipated
that the bright line rule would eliminate the confusion created by the subjec-
tive, case-by-case approach of the voluntariness test.89
criminal laws." Id. at 467. The Court clearly stated, however, that until such a substitute was
proffered, the safeguards it set forth must be followed. Id
85. Id. at 479.
This does not mean... that each police station must have a "station house law-
yer" present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police
propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a
lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to
any interrogation.
Id. at 474.
86. Id.
87. Id. In his dissent, Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and White, concluded
that:
The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistaka-
bly banned forms of coercion. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in
court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.
Rather, the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous
or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all. The aim in
short is toward "voluntariness" in a utopian sense, or to view it from a different
angle, voluntariness with a vengeance.
Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). One commentator remarked: "The difference between the
Miranda majority and dissenters lies in their differing views.., on the social costs of applying
the Miranda rule to custodial interrogations-the dissenters predicating it would lead to a
decrease in criminal convictions." Lippman, supra note 36, at 257.
88. See Lippman, supra note 36, at 280.
89. See id.
1276 [Vol. 39:1267
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III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MIRANDA'S REQUIREMENTS
Miranda made clear that a recitation of the exact language the Court pro-
posed was not a per se requirement for the admissibility of custodial state-
ments.90 To the contrary, the Court intended that its enunciated warnings
were to be used "in the absence of a fully effective equivalent." 9 1 Through-
out the Miranda opinion, however, the Court pointed out that any substi-
tuted warnings must be equally effective in apprising a suspect of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the fifth amendment. 92 Armed with
this language, the Supreme Court, along with lower federal and state courts,
has been willing to accept warnings that deviate from the explicit language
set forth in Miranda. 93 The courts, however, have held that substitutes to
Miranda requirements are not limitless.
A. The Supreme Court Rejects Miranda Warnings Linking Right to
Counsel to a Future Event After Questioning
In California v. Prysock,94 the United States Supreme Court proclaimed
that no precise formulation of the Miranda warnings is required to pass con-
stitutional muster.9 5 The Court found, however, that warnings informing
the accused that the right to appointed counsel attaches only after question-
ing are inadequate to protect the individual's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.9 6 In Prysock, police arrested Randall James Prysock, a
minor, for murder.9" Prysock initially refused to cooperate with police, but,
after speaking with his parents, he consented to police questioning.9" Dur-
ing a tape recorded interrogation, police explained, and Prysock professed to
understand, his Miranda rights.99 At trial, however, Prysock attempted to
suppress his recorded statements, contending that the warnings did not ad-
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
91. Id
92. See infra note 188.
93. See infra notes 94-140 and accompanying text.
94. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
95. Id. at 359.
96. Id at 360-61.
97. Id at 356.
98. Id at 357.
99. Id. When Prysock was first brought to the police station, he was read his rights. Id
at 356. At the recorded session, the police officer sought to clarify these rights and make sure
Prysock understood them. Id During this recitation, the officer also added, between the third
and fourth elements of the Miranda rights, that, as a juvenile, Prysock had the right to have
his parents present. Id at 357. At Mrs. Prysock's request, the questioning officer elaborated
that Prysock could have an attorney at a later time if he waived his right to counsel now. Id
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vise him of his right to a free attorney prior to and during the police
questioning.'00
A California trial court denied Prysock's motion to suppress the state-
ments, and a jury convicted him of first-degree murder.1 't The California
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court decision, finding the warnings defi-
cient under Miranda 1 2 In effect, the California Court of Appeal held the
warnings deficient because of the order in which the police gave them.'0 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal."
The Supreme Court held that the warnings given Prysock did not suggest
any limitations on his right to the presence of counsel during police interro-
gation, and that the warnings fully conveyed the requirements of Mi-
randa. '5 The Court noted that other courts examining the sequencing of
pre-interrogation warnings were not concerned with a verbatim recitation of
Miranda, but focused on whether police warnings linked the right to ap-
pointed counsel to a point in time after police interrogation.0 6 Warnings
with a link to a future event, the Court stated, did not fully advise suspects
100. Id at 358.
101. Id Prysock was also convicted of murder with two special circumstances (torture and
robbery); robbery with the use of a dangerous weapon; burglary with the use of a deadly
weapon; automobile theft; escape from a youth facility; and destruction of evidence. Id
102. Id In an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal found the warnings
given Prysock inadequate because they did not explicitly inform him of his right to have an
attorney appointed before further questioning. Id at 358-59. The California Supreme Court
denied a petition for rehearing, with two Justices dissenting. Id. at 359.
103. Id. at 361.
104. The Court granted certiorari because the
California Court of Appeal essentially laid down a flat rule requiring that the content
of Miranda warnings be a virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the
Miranda opinion.... Such a rigid rule was not mandated by Miranda or any other
decision of this Court, and is not required to serve the purposes of Miranda ....
Id
105. Id at 361. "The warnings given [Prysock] were defective, not because 'the officer did
not parrot the language of Miranda,' but because, in the form in which the warnings were
given, they failed to convey the essential information required by Miranda." Id at 364 n.2
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 361 (majority opinion). The Court cited two cases where such a situation ex-
isted. In United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134, 134 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), the court
found advice to the defendant that "she could 'have an attorney appointed to represent you
when you first appear before the U.S. Commissioner or the Court'" inadequate. Likewise, in
People v. Bolinski, 260 Cal. App. 2d 705, 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347, 358 (1968), warnings were
deemed insufficient where a defendant, who was currently in Illinois but was to be transported
to California, was told that "'the court would appoint [an attorney] in Riverside County [,
California].'" The Prysock Court noted that both of these cases exemplified a situation in
which warnings were invalid because they failed fully to advise the suspect of his right to
appointed counsel before police interrogation. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361.
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of their Miranda rights.' 07 The Court concluded, however, that the warn-
ings given Prysock did not suffer from that defect,' 08 because the warnings
gave complete notice of the right to appointed counsel prior to
interrogation.' 9
B. Lower Courts in Disagreement as to Sufficiency of Miranda Warnings
Linking Right to Counsel to a Future Event After Questioning
Both before and after the Prysock decision, trial courts reached contradic-
tory results over warnings which link the right to counsel with an event after
police questioning. In United States ex reL Placek v. Illinois, "o the defend-
ant was advised that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be "ap-
pointed through the Court for him.""' The defendant argued that the
warning did not specifically advise him of his right to immediate appoint-
ment of counsel and, therefore, was deficient under Miranda. 2 In rejecting
the defendant's argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit relied on earlier cases which held that similar warnings effec-
tively advised the accused that no statement would be required until an
attorney could be consulted.' 1 Placek, the court noted, did not involve in-
107. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360. In both Garcia and Bolinski, "the reference to appointed
counsel was linked to a future point in time after police interrogation, and therefore did not
fully advise the suspect of his right to appointed counsel before such interrogation." Id.
108. Dissenting Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall disagreed. They pointed out that
suspects must be "adequately informed" of their right to appointed counsel prior to question-
ing and that Prysock was not provided with this "crucial information." Id. at 363-64 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Noting that Miranda requires "'meaningful advice ... in language which [an
accused] can comprehend and on which he can knowingly act,"' the dissent argued that the
warnings given were open to several reasonable interpretations and therefore could in no way
be deemed meaningful. Id at 364 n.3 (quoting Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967)).
109. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360-61. " This is not a case in which the defendant was not
informed of his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning... or in which the offer
of an appointed attorney was associated with a future time in court ....... Id. at 361 (quoting
United States v. Noa, 443 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1971)).
110. 546 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1976). The case came to the Seventh Circuit on a habeas
corpus petition after petitioner was convicted in a bench trial before an Illinois court and after
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the petition
without an evidentiary hearing. Id
111. Id at 1300.
112. Id.
113. The court relied on United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1973),
which in turn relied on United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 907 (1970). The warnings in Lamia, however, were substantially different from those
given in Placek. In Lamia, the defendant was told: "You have the right to talk to a lawyer for
advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning. If you
cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you if you wish." Lamia, 429 F.2d at 375
n. 1. The warnings do not mention the appointment of counsel attaching at some future time.
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ternally inconsistent warnings advising an accused of the right to counsel
prior to questioning while explaining that an attorney could not be ap-
pointed until a later time.114 Further, the court concluded, the warnings
given did not "purport to take away in one sentence rights announced in
another."' 5
In Lathers v. United States, 116 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit deemed invalid a warning similar to that given in Placek Spe-
cifically, the police warned Lathers that if he was unable to afford an attor-
ney, "the Commissioner or the Court [would] appoint one" for him.' 17 In a
strongly worded opinion, the Fifth Circuit stated that Miranda warnings
must be so clear that they remove all doubt as to the right to counsel prior to
questioning." 8 The court concluded that a warning implying that an attor-
114. The court contrasted the present warnings with those given in United States ex rel
Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134
(9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); and Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967).
115. Placek, 546 F.2d at 1300-01; see also Richardson v. Duckworth, 834 F.2d 1366, 1370-
71 (7th Cir. 1987) (viewed under the totality of the circumstances, an oral explanation to the
defendant that "'it [would] take some time'" before an attorney would be appointed does not
make Miranda warnings invalid); Tasby v. United States, 451 F.2d 394, 398-99 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922 (1972) (advisement that an attorney would be appointed "'at the
proper time' . . . does not negate the over-all effectiveness of the warning"); United States v.
Oliver, 421 F.2d 1034, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 1970) (remanded to determine whether warning
"that if [you] could not afford an attorney, the United States Commissioner... would appoint
one for [you]" was sufficient under Miranda); Klinger v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 307-08
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969) (warning that you "have the right to have an
attorney appointed by the Court for you if you are later charged with a Federal offense" is
adequate under Miranda); Mayzak v. United States, 402 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1968) (an
agent's statement "that the [Federal Bureau of Investigation] could not furnish a lawyer until
federal charges were proffered against him does not vitiate the sufficiency of an otherwise ade-
quate warning").
State courts have also accepted warnings linking the appointment of counsel with some
point in time after questioning. See, e.g., State v. Maluia, 56 Haw. 428, 539 P.2d 1200 (1975);
Emler v. State, 259 Ind. 241, 286 N.E.2d 408 (1972); and Jones v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 337, 230
N.W.2d 677 (1975).
116. 396 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1968).
117. Id at 535.
118. Id. The court stated:
The Miranda warning must effectively convey to the accused that he is entitled to
a government-furnished counsel here and now. If the words are subject to the con-
struction that such counsel will be available only in the future, Miranda has not been
obeyed. Although there is no talismanic or heraldic abracadabra which must be ful-
filled, the offer of counsel must be clarion and firm, not one of mere impressionism.
The words must asseverate with conviction that any accused can have a lawyer
before speaking. Otherwise, the warning is delusory and the Miranda safeguards are
illusory.
Id (footnote omitted).
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ney would only be appointed "somewhere down the line" is inadequate. 9
Further, the court stressed that an accused in a criminal case must be in-
formed of the right to the presence of counsel prior to speaking. 2
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the effect of contradictory police warnings on a defendant's under-
standing of Miranda rights. In United States v. Connell, 12 the police told
the defendant that if he could not afford an attorney one might be appointed
to represent him. 22 A written warning, which Connell read simultaneously,
stated, however, that arrangements would be made in accordance with the
law if Connell could not afford an attorney. 123 The Ninth Circuit noted that
other circuit decisions found Miranda warnings adequate even though the
warnings failed to state explicitly the right to have an attorney present prior
to and during questioning, provided that right could be easily inferred from
the totality of the warnings given.' 24 Here, however, the Ninth Circuit la-
beled the warnings given "affirmatively misleading," because, taken to-
gether, they created confusion and were open to misinterpretation.1 2
C. "If And When You Go To Court" Caveat Adds
to Lower Court Confusion
Miranda warnings advising that an attorney will be appointed "if and
when you go to court" have caused considerable dissension and confusion
119. Id
120. Id Cf United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 849 (1982) (holding that Prysock effectively overruled Lathers and any other precedent
which required Miranda warnings to "convey to the accused his right to appointed counsel
'here and now' "). Note the court's closing comment, however, which states: "The warnings
[given to the defendant] did not condition appointment of an attorney on any future event and
therefore were not deficient." Contreras, 667 F.2d at 979; see also United States v. Garcia, 431
F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Sullins v. United States, 389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1968);
Fendley v. United States, 384 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967).
121. 869 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1989).
122. Id. at 1350 (emphasis in original).
123. Id The oral warning included:
[T]he right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to
have a lawyer present with you during questioning. However, you must make your
own arrangements to obtain a lawyer and this will be at no expense to the Govern-
ment. If you cannot afford to pay for a lawyer, one may be appointed to represent
you.
Id (emphasis in original). In contrast, the written warning stated, in pertinent part: "I further
understand that if I cannot afford to pay for a lawyer and want one arrangements will be made
for me to obtain a lawyer in accordance with the law." Id. at 1350-51 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 1352. The court cited Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 307-08 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967), and United States v. Noa, 443 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1971).
125. Connell, 869 F.2d at 1352-53.
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among reviewing courts. 126 In Massimo v. United States, 127 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "if and when"
warnings were not fatal to the effectiveness of Miranda rights. In Massimo,
the police advised the defendant upon arrest that he had the right to ap-
pointed counsel before and during questioning. The police, however, also
told Massimo that they could not furnish him with an attorney at the pres-
ent time, and that an attorney would be appointed to represent him "if and
when he went to court."' 25 The Second Circuit held that Massimo could
only conclude from the warnings that "since he was clearly entitled to have a
lawyer present during questioning and since no lawyer could now be pro-
vided, he could not now be questioned."' 129
In United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, '30 however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held an identical warning to be a
clear violation of Miranda. ' In Williams, the court found that an attempt
to question a suspect after informing him that a court could not immediately
provide counsel was the type of practice anticipated and condemned by Mi-
126. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Procedure: Miranda Warning and the Right to "Instant
Counsel"--A Growing Schism, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 957 (1976).
127. 463 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 117 (1973).
128. Id. at 1173. The waiver form signed by Massimo stated, in part:
(c) You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions
and to have him with you during questioning.
(d) You have the same right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you
cannot afford to hire one. We have no way offurnishing you a lawyer but one will be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court.
Id (emphasis in original).
129. Id at 1174; see also United States v. Lacy, 446 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1971) ("if and
when you go to court" language is "immaterial since [the defendant] was informed that he had
the right to put off answering any questions until the time when he did have an appointed
attorney"); accord Wright v, North Carolina, 483 F.2d 405 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 936 (1974); Mayzak v. United States, 402 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1968); Schade v. State, 512
P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973); State v. Mumbaugh, 107 Ariz. 589, 491 P.2d 443 (1971); State v.
Sterling, 377 So.2d 58 (La. 1979); People v. Campbell, 26 Mich. App. 196, 182 N.W.2d 4
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971); Harrell v. State, 357 So.2d 643 (Miss. 1978); People
v. Swift, 32 A.D.2d 183, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 (1970);
Rowbotham v. State, 542 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 907 (1976);
Grennier v. State, 70 Wis.2d 204, 234 N.W.2d 316 (1975).
130. 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972).
131. Id. at 1250. The court found the "if and when you go to court" warning not an
"effective and express explanation;" to the contrary, it was equivocal and ambiguous.
In one breath appellant was informed that he had the right to appointed counsel
during questioning. In the next breath, he was told that counsel could not be pro-
vided until later.... The entire warning is therefore, at best, misleading and confus-
ing and, at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation to the unsophisticated, indigent
accused to forego the right to counsel at this critical moment.
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randa 132 The Seventh Circuit stated that a warning advising a defendant of
the right to consult with counsel must be clear and unequivocal, not mislead-
ing and confusing like the "if and when" language. 133 Therefore, the court
asserted, an "if and when" warning fails to convey to the accused an effective
and express explanation of Miranda rights. 13
4
The Seventh Circuit has attempted to reconcile cases such as Placek in
which the warning refers to the court's role in appointing counsel, with cases
such as Williams, which link the appointment of counsel with some time
after questioning. In United States v. Sanchez; " the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the variation in the conflicting circuit
court approach to the wording of Miranda warnings to be "one of de-
gree.' 136 In Sanchez, the arresting officer told the defendant that if he could
not afford an attorney, the court would appoint one for him.137 En route to
the police station, Sanchez made incriminating statements which were subse-
quently used against him at trial. 13  Noting that the police recited to
Sanchez his other Miranda rights, that Sanchez had experience with the
criminal justice system, and that the defendant was not coerced into making
a statement, the court stated that it was confident that admitting Sanchez's
incriminating statements would not deprive him of his right against self-in-
crimination. 139 The court therefore focused on whether there was a valid
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination."4
132. Id at 1251. The dissent, however, found this an "overly technical application of the
Miranda rule." Id at 1253 (Pell, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 1250.
134. Id; see also United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533, 541 (7th Cir. 1971) ("if and when"
language is insufficient to inform a defendant of the right to appointed counsel during interro-
gation); Gilpin v. United States, 415 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1969) ("if and when" language
does not convey the notion that a defendant is entitled to a lawyer then and there); Square v.
State, 283 Ala. 548, 550, 219 So.2d 377, 378-79 (1968) ("if and when" warning insufficient
under Miranda); Moore v. State, 251 Ark. 436, 442-43, 472 S.W.2d 940, 944 (1971) ("if and
when" language does not comply with Miranda); State v. McBroom, 394 N.W.2d 806, 812
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ("if you appear in court" caveat was improper, but statement made in
response to warning was not incriminating and new trial not required); State v. Dess, 184
Mont. 116, 120-22, 602 P.2d 142, 144-45 (1979) ("if and when" warning is inconsistent with
Miranda and therefore defective); State v. Robbins, 4 N.C. App. 463, 464-65, 167 S.E.2d 16,
17-18 (1969) ("if and when" warning did not effectively apprise defendant of his Miranda
rights); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 351-57, 399 A.2d 111, 112-14 (1979) ("if and
when" statement is "inadequate to fully inform appellant of his constitutional rights").
135. 859 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1144 (1989).
136. Id at 485. The court also noted that "[i]t would be folly to pretend that our cases
establish a clear principle." Id
137. Id at 484.
138. Id
139. Id at 485-86.
140. Id. at 484-85.
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Sanchez exemplifies a return to the pre-Miranda practice of judging the
adequacy of the custodial warnings on a case-by-case basis. Significantly, a
return to a subjective approach undermines the Miranda Court's intent to
utilize a bright line rule for determining the voluntariness of confessions.
IV. DUCKWORTH v EAGAN: STRETCHING MIRANDA
BEYOND ITs LIMrrs
In Duckworth v. Eagan, 4 , the United States Supreme Court reduced the
test for determining the adequacy of Miranda requirements to a simple in-
quiry as to whether the warnings "reasonably conveyed" to a suspect the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. In Duckworth, Eagan re-
ported to a friend on the Chicago police force that he had seen a woman's
body, which had been stabbed, lying along the beach of Lake Michigan.142
Eagan voluntarily led several police officers to the site where he had seen the
body, whereupon the victim, still alive, immediately identified Eagan as her
assailant.143 While Eagan admitted being with the victim earlier that night,
he denied any involvement in the crime and contended that both he and the
victim were attacked by a group of men who then abducted the woman.144
The following morning, Eagan voluntarily went to the police station for
further questioning. 145 Prior to interrogation, the police, reading from a
waiver form, told Eagan that he had the right to counsel prior to and during
questioning, and that this right existed even if he could not afford to hire an
attorney.Y6 The next sentence of the waiver, however, read: "We have no
way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if
and when you go to court."147 After signing the form, Eagan repeated his
141. 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
142. Id at 2876-77.
143. Id. at 2877. The victim, upon seeing Eagan, exclaimed: "Why did you stab me? Why
did you stab me?" Id
144. Id.
145. Id. After filing a battery complaint against his alleged attackers at a local police sta-
tion, Eagan agreed to go to the Hammond, Indiana police station for further questioning. Id
The Hammond, Indiana police were deemed to have jurisdiction over the case. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id The entire waiver form, entitled "Voluntary Appearance; Advice of Rights,"
provided:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the
right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have
a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him
with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a
lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer,
but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court If you wish
to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answer-
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exculpatory statement of the previous night. 4 ' The police detained Eagan
at the stationhouse overnight and twenty-nine hours later, after signing a
second waiver,"' Eagan confessed to stabbing the victim.' 5°
An Indiana trial court admitted both Eagan's exculpatory and inculpatory
statements, and a jury convicted him of attempted murder.'51 The trial
court sentenced Eagan to thirty-five years imprisonment.1"2 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Indiana upheld Eagan's conviction for attempted murder,
finding that regardless of the "if and when" language, Eagan understood his
fifth amendment rights and knowingly and intelligently waived those
rights. 15 3 The United States District Court for the Northern District of In-
diana determined that the police adhered to the appropriate standards pro-
ing questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until
you've talked to a lawyer.
Id (emphasis supplied by court) (citation omitted). The waiver continued:
I, [Gary Eagan] have come to the Detective Bureau of the Hammond, Indiana Police
Department, of my own choice to talk with Offiers ... In [sic] regard to an investi-
gation they are conducting. I know that I am not under arrest and that I can leave
this office if I wish to do so.
Prior to any questioning, I was furnished with the above statement of my rights....
I have (read) (had read to me) this statement of my rights. I understand what my
rights are. I am willing to answer questions and make a statement. I do not want a
lawyer. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been
made to me and no pressure of any kind has been used against me.
Id at 2877 n.1 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 2877.
149. Id. The second waiver form provided:
1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the right to remain
silent and that anything I might say may or will be used against me in a court of law.
2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choice before
saying anything, and that an attorney may be present while I am making any state-
ment or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so
choose.
3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the course of the
taking of any statement or during the course of any such conversation.
4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer any further
questions and remain silent, thereby terminating the conversation.
5. That if I do not hire an attorney, one will be provided for me.
Id at 2877-78 (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 2878. Eagan admitted that he stabbed the victim nine times after she refused to
have sexual relations with him. Id. at 2876. The following day, Eagan led police to the loca-
tion of the knife used in the attack as well as various articles of the victim's clothing. Id. at
2878.
151. The trial court also admitted the knife used in the stabbing and several articles of tl~e
victim's clothing. See Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th Cir. 1988); Eagaiiv.
Indiana, 480 N.E.2d 946, 948 (Ind. 1985). Eagan was acquitted of rape. See Eagan, 843 F.2d
at 1556.
152. See Eagan, 480 N.E.2d at 947.
153. Id at 947-50. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
denied Eagan's petition for a writ of habeus corpus. See Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878.
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scribed in Miranda and denied Eagan's habeas corpus petition."54 Eagan
appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.155 A divided Seventh Circuit, relying
principally on its previous decision in United States ex rel. Williams v. Two-
mey, 156 held that the warning given Eagan was constitutionally defective be-
cause the language failed to give the accused a clear and unequivocal
admonition of the right to appointed counsel prior to any interrogation.
157
The Court reversed and remanded the proceeding for a determination of
whether Eagan waived his right to counsel knowingly and intelligently.1 58
In dissent, one Seventh Circuit judge labeled the court's approach to the
Miranda warnings as "formalistic, technical and unrealistic," arguing that
the first set of warnings given Eagan satisfied the requirements of Mi-
randa."159 The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 16 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
lower courts as to whether language indicating an attorney will be appointed
"if and when you go to court" renders Miranda warnings inadequate. 161
A. The Majority: Nonchalantly Misinterpreting Miranda
A majority of five Justices professed to apply Miranda in light of the
Court's original intent to provide a prophylactic rule. Specifically, the ma-
jority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, placed particular empha-
sis on the Miranda disclaimer that the warnings suggested by the Court in its
decision were required to satisfy the fifth amendment only in the absence of a
"fully effective equivalent." 162 The Chief Justice further pointed out that
since the Miranda decision, the Court had never insisted that Miranda warn-
ings be in the exact form described in the Court's opinion. 163 The majority
theorized that the Court's flexible approach to the wording of the warnings
154. See Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989) (No. 88-
317) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
155. See id. at 4.
156. 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972).
157. Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1557.
158. Id. at 1558. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc with four judges dissent-
ing from that order. See Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878.
159. Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1561-62 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
160. See Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878; Petitioners' Brief at 4.
161. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878. Although the Court of Appeals specifically remanded
the case for a determination whether Eagan made a knowing and intelligent waiver during the
second interrogation, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the broader issue of whether
"'if and when you go to court' renders Miranda warnings inadequate." Id. (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 2879 (quoting Miranda 384 U.S. at 476).
163. Id; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980) (referring to "the now familiar
Miranda warnings... or their equivalent"); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359 ("no talismanic incanta-
tion [is] required to satisfy [Miranda's] strictures").
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was a function of a practical concern that an officer outside the stationhouse
might not have access to printed Miranda warnings." Therefore, that of-
ficer might inadvertently deviate from standard Miranda warnings, espe-
cially if a suspect requested an elaboration of the warnings.16 The majority
also noted that, because Miranda warnings are a prophylactic measure and
not a right specifically protected under the Constitution,166 reviewing courts
need not dissect the language used "as if construing a will or defining the
terms of an easement."'' 67 Rather, the majority stated, to determine whether
there was a violation of an accused's constitutional rights, a court need only
ascertain whether the officer "reasonably" conveyed the Miranda rights to
the accused.
168
The Chief Justice noted that the "if and when you go to court" language,
used to explain when an attorney would be appointed, correctly described
Indiana's procedure for the appointment of counsel. 169 Further, the Chief
Justice contended, such language simply anticipated a commonplace ques-
tion asked by an accused: "When will I obtain appointed counsel? 1 70 The
Chief Justice also made clear that the Court's Miranda decision did not re-
quire that police have a stationhouse lawyer or an attorney producible on
call, it only required that a suspect be informed of his right to appointed
counsel. 71 The Court asserted that if the police could not provide counsel,
they need only refrain from questioning a suspect, unless there is a voluntary
and knowing waiver of the right to counsel. 172 The Chief Justice found that
Eagan did indeed waive his right to counsel when he signed the waiver
form. 
173
The majority expressed little concern for the specific wording of the warn-
ings as long as those warnings "reasonably conveyed" to the suspect his con-
stitutional rights and "touched all the bases" of Miranda. Further, the
164. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
165. Id
166. "The prophylactic Miranda warnings are 'not themselves rights protected by the Con-
stitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion [is] protected.'" Id at 2880 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
167. Id.
168. Id
169. Id. Under Indiana law, once a "person is found to be indigent, the judicial officer
shall assign counsel to him." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-6 (Burns 1985).
170. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
171. Id.
172. Id. The Chief Justice, however, did not mention Miranda's requirement that an attor-
ney be provided within a reasonable period of time. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
474 (1966).
173. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
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majority held that the adequacy of Miranda warnings given an accused need
not be measured word by word, but should be measured in their totality.' 74
B. Concurrence: Miranda Claims Inappropriate for Federal Habeas
Corpus Review
While joining the majority's opinion and judgment, Justice O'Connor is-
sued a separate concurrence asserting that Eagan's claim was unnecessarily
before the Court. Specifically, Justice O'Connor declared that Eagan's sup-
pression remedy for violation of Miranda was an inappropriate ground for
appeal in a federal habeas corpus petition.175 Justice O'Connor relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell176 to support her
position. In Stone, the Court held that when a full and fair opportunity to
litigate a claim in state court is made available to a defendant, it is not ap-
propriate to subject that same probative evidence to a federal habeas
proceeding. 177
Justice O'Connor reinforced the majority's assertion that the Miranda
rule is a prophylactic measure and not a dictate of the fifth amendment.1 71
The effect of the Miranda rule, according to Justice O'Connor, was to over-
protect fifth amendment guarantees at the expense of uncovering evidence of
crime and punishing criminals. 179 Justice O'Connor further speculated that
relitigating a Miranda claim did not further a fundamental intent of the Mi-
174. Id. at 2881.
175. Id. at 2882 (O'Connor, J., concurring). While the focus of this Note is on the require-
ments under the Supreme Court's Miranda decision, and not the propriety of a habeas corpus
petition under the facts of Duckworth, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion sheds light on
her view of the Miranda decision.
Eighteen state and federal judges have now given plenary consideration to [Eagan's]
Miranda claims. None of these judges has intimated any doubt as to (Eagan's] guilt
or the voluntariness and probative value of his confession. After seven years of litiga-
tion, the initial determination of the Miranda issue by the state trial judge and the
Indiana Supreme Court has been found to be the correct one. In my view, the federal
courts' exercise of habeas jurisdiction in this case has served no one: no violation of
the Fifth Amendment itself has ever been alleged; there is no doubt that [Eagan] is
guilty of the crime of which he was convicted and deserving of punishment; [Eagan]
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in state court; and the marginal
possibility that police adherence to Miranda will be enhanced by suppression of
highly probative evidence some seven years after the police conduct at issue in this
case is far outweighed by the harm to society's interest in punishing and incapacitat-
ing those who violate its criminal laws.
Id Justice Scalia joined in Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
176. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
177. Id at 486. The Stone Court's holding specifically applied to police conduct which
allegedly violated the fourth amendment.
178. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179. Id.
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randa decision-to create a disincentive for police officers to coerce confes-
sions from the accused-because the award of habeas relief would come
years after a conviction, and therefore have no appreciable effect on police
behavior." 0 Based on these presumptions, Justice O'Connor concluded that
Miranda claims seeking suppression of probative evidence are inappropriate
for federal habeas review.
C. The Dissent: An Honest Interpretation of Miranda
1. Suspects Must be Clearly Informed of Their Miranda Rights
The dissent, authored by Justice Marshall,' focused on the Miranda de-
cision's requirement that a police warning "clearly inform" a suspect that if
he cannot afford an attorney, the court will appoint one prior to police ques-
tioning.182 Justice Marshall asserted that a warning including an "if and
when you go to court" caveat does not clearly inform a suspect of this
right. 8 3 Rather, the dissent stated, an "if and when" warning does exactly
what the Supreme Court denounced in California v. Prysock; 4 it links the
right to appointed counsel with some event to take place after question-
ing."8 ' Justice Marshall observed that the majority decision simply ignored
the fact that the warnings given Eagan were exactly the type previously con-
180. Id at 2883-84.
181. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice
Marshall prefaced his dissent by stating that he "refus[ed] to acquiesce in the continuing de-
basement of [the] historic [Miranda] precedent," and cited Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985) (holding that a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings, need not be sup-
pressed solely because the police had obtained an earlier confession without giving Miranda
warnings) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing a "public safety" excep-
tion to Miranda, whereby a suspect's answer to a police question can be admitted without the
administration of Miranda warnings if there is an immediate danger to the public) as authority
for his position. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Miranda, the Court
stated:
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly in-
formed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate
today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated
can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to inter-
rogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been
aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is
there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966).
183. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2886-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
184. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
185. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1990] 1289
Catholic University Law Review
demned by the Court in Prysock 1 6 Thus, concluded Justice Marshall,
Duckworth could not be reconciled with the Court's decision in Prysock 18 7
While the dissent readily conceded that Miranda required no specific ver-
bal formulation, Justice Marshall pointed to specific portions of the Miranda
opinion in which the Miranda Court required, at the very least, substantial
compliance with the enunciated requirements.' Relying on the Court's no-
tion of substantial similarity, Justice Marshall concluded that a "clear and
unequivocal" warning, with regard to the right to appointed counsel prior to
questioning, was an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.189 The dissent,
unlike the majority opinion, also emphasized that the protections afforded
by the Miranda Court's decision specifically applied to indigents to ensure
that they, too, had a right to counsel. 0 In particular, the dissent noted
that, according to Miranda, only effective and express explanation of the
right to appointed counsel can ensure that an indigent suspect is able to
understand and exercise the right to an attorney. 9' Without such an expla-
nation, the dissent asserted, an accused's fifth amendment right becomes
hollow. 192
Justice Marshall also criticized the majority opinion for failing to notice
that the recipients of Miranda warnings are often "frightened suspects unlet-
tered in the law."' 93 The dissent opined that, because an accused often lacks
an understanding of the law, it would be unreasonable to expect the accused
186. Id. at 2888-89. The Prysock Court explained that if the "reference to appointed coun-
sel was linked to a future point in time after police interrogation[, the warning would] not fully
advise the suspect of his right to appointed counsel before such interrogation." Prysock, 453
U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). Yet, significantly, the majority in Duckworth cavalierly substi-
tutes the word "reasonably" for the Prysock Court's "fully." See id. at 361.
187. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2889.
188. Id.; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) ("only a fully effective
equivalent of the warnings described will pass muster"); id. at 444 (requiring "other fully
effective means"); id. at 467 (requiring "alternative that is at least as effective"); id. at 490
(stating that "Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege
[against self-incrimination], so long as they are fully as effective as those described above").
189. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2889 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471).
190. Id Without an additional warning that an indigent suspect will also be appointed
counsel to represent him,
the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as
meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to
obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in
terms that would convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to interro-
gation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473.
191. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473.
192. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2887.
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to interpret easily contradictory and ambiguous "if and when" warnings.194
The dissent asserted that the Chief Justice, in his majority opinion, failed to
recognize the Miranda decision's focus on language that would actually con-
vey to the accused the right to have counsel present prior to and during
police interrogation. 195
Further, the dissent found little comfort in the fact that the warning given
Eagan correctly described the procedure for appointment of counsel in Indi-
ana.196 The dissent asserted that there is a strong indication that Eagan felt
coerced into talking with the police. 197 According to Justice Marshall, the
likelihood that Eagan interpreted the warning to mean that it would be a
long time before he would be appointed counsel may, in itself, have com-
pelled him to talk to the police. 198 Justice Marshall suggested that a warn-
ing subject to such an interpretation is exactly the type of coercive police
practice the Miranda Court condemned, and sought to end, with its
decision. 199
Finally, the dissent offered a simple solution for eradicating the confusion
caused by "if and when" warnings. The dissent posited that to delete the
offending language from the waiver form posed only a slight burden on law
enforcement officers."c° Devoid of this language, the dissent concluded, the
warning would give a suspect the straightforward message that the right to
an attorney prior to and during police questioning is not dependent on
whether the accused goes to court.20 '
2. An Uninvited and Inaccurate Concurrence
Declaring that Justice O'Connor's concurrence paved the way for future
assaults on federal habeas corpus review, the dissent attacked the legitimacy
and rationale of that opinion.2"2 The dissent further asserted that the
Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell,203 heavily relied upon by Jus-
194. Id; see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 356, 399 A.2d 111, 115 (1979). The
court, faced with similar "if and when" language, stated: "It cannot seriously be maintained
that the pretzel-like warnings here-intertwining, contradictory, and ambiguous as they are-
gave appellant 'a better understanding of his constitutional rights' than a straightforward reci-
tation of those rights would have." I
195. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2887-88; see supra note 169.
197. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198. Id
199. Ia
200. Id. at 2889.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2889-90. Justice Brennan joined this part of the dissent, while Justices Black-
mun and Stevens joined only as to Part 1. Id at 2885.
203. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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tice O'Connor, "was wrong when it was decided and it is wrong today."2 ' 4
The dissent noted that Congress never indicated that certain federal claims
should be afforded federal habeas review and others should be deemed un-
worthy.2 "5 Rather, the dissent contended, Congress deemed all federal
claims equally deserving of federal habeas review.' 6 Assuming that Stone
was properly decided, the dissent stated that a Miranda claim exemplifies a
situation in which federal habeas review is appropriate.2 "7 Backing this
proposition, the dissent noted that a Miranda claim brings into question the
probity of the factfinding process at the state court level, thereby requiring
federal review.20"
The dissent further accused Justice O'Connor of harboring an intense dis-
taste for the Miranda decision.2 "9 The dissent noted, however, that regard-
less of the concurring opinion's view of the merits of Miranda, the decision
was still good law.210 The dissent further observed that the federal courts
have been reviewing Miranda claims via habeas corpus petitions for the last
twenty-three years without an indication of disapproval from Congress.2 1
The dissent concluded that if Justice O'Connor was discontent with the Mi-
randa decision, she should attack the decision head on, rather than advocat-
ing that federal courts be barred from deciding Miranda claims on habeas
corpus review.2" 2 Ultimately, the dissent concluded that Justice O'Connor's
indirect attack on Miranda constituted "judicial activism at its worst., 213
204. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2890 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id. Justice Marshall stated:
I have read and reread the federal habeas corpus statute, but I am unable to find any
statement to the effect that certain federal claims are... more worthy of collateral
protection than others.... On the contrary, Congress deemed all federal claims
worthy of collateral protection when it extended the writ to any person "in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State Court... in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States."
1d. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988) (emphasis added)).
207. Id. at 2891-92.
208. Id.; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977).
209. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2891 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. Id, The dissent stated:
But irrespective of one's view of the merits of Miranda, the critical point is that
Miranda is still good law. With few exceptions, prosecutors in state courts may not
introduce statements taken from a criminal suspect in violation of his Miranda
rights. If a state trial court permits the introduction of such statements, federal con-
stitutional error has been committed. Unless the defendant's conviction is reversed,
he is indisputably being held "in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United
States."
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988) (emphasis by Court)).
211. Id. at 2893.
212. Id,
213. Id.
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V. GRADUALLY UNDERMINING THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. An Unfortunate Interpretation of Miranda
In Duckworth v. Eagan, the Supreme Court concentrated on the flexibility
of Miranda's language rather than on the concerns and intent of the Mi-
randa Court's decision. In effect, Duckworth held that any language which
"reasonably conveys" to the accused the right to the appointment of an at-
torney, either immediately or in the future, is acceptable.214 By allowing the
warnings in Duckworth to pass constitutional muster, and by failing to pro-
vide a clear standard for lower courts to review the wording of Miranda
warnings, the Duckworth Court's decision will likely precipitate inconsistent
results.2 1 s Moreover, if the Court's holding can be read so broadly as to
allow any warnings which "touc[h] all of the bases required by Miranda,"
Duckworth constitutes a significant erosion of the accused's right against
self-incrimination.21 6
Justice Marshall's dissent, on the other hand, interpreted Miranda in ac-
cordance with the Court's original decision. The dissent noted that Miranda
clearly requires that, once a suspect is taken into custody, the police must
convey to that suspect rights secured under the fifth amendment. These
warnings must be in language that an accused will understand, and that per-
mits an accused to make a voluntary and informed decision.217 While the
Miranda Court did not profess that the language it suggested was ideal, the
Court did endorse the principles behind the language it proposed.2 18 The
214. Id. at 2880 (majority opinion).
215. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked to the warnings in their total-
ity. Id. at 2881. Because Eagan was given "good" Miranda warnings prior to the "if and
when" language, his statements were properly admitted. Id. However, the Chief Justice did
not put a limitation on what police can tell a suspect after giving valid Miranda warnings. For
that reason, the Court has opened the door for other confusing and misleading police
statements.
216. For example, after satisfying the requirements of Miranda may the police add, in a
warning or waiver form, that "although you have these rights, we have no way of allowing you
to implement them"?
217. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("only by effective and express
explanation to the indigent . . . can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to
exercise it") (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966)).
218. The Miranda Court stated:
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being com-
pelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime con-
tains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In
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Duckworth Court appears to misread Miranda, allowing language
equivalents that undermine the principles that initially compelled the Mi-
randa Court's decision. Further, by adopting a "reasonableness" test, the
Duckworth Court has frustrated Miranda's objective of eliminating subjec-
tiveness through a bright line rule.219
In addition, as the dissent explicitly suggests, an "if and when you go to
court" caveat is not only unreasonable, but also unnecessary.22 ° If, as the
Chief Justice suggests, the "if and when" language simply anticipates a com-
monplace question of suspects taken into custody, 221 such language should
be conveyed to an accused when requested.222 Because Eagan did not initi-
ate questioning concerning appointment of counsel, but was told that he
could not obtain counsel until he went to court, the officer should have been
required to further inform Eagan that if an attorney were requested, then all
questioning would terminate. The addition of such a requirement would be
consistent with the Miranda Court's attempt to provide protection from the
coercive nature of custodial interrogation.223
Moreover, because "if and when" language is open to numerous interpre-
tations,224 warnings should be looked at from the perspective of the accused.
Here, Eagan could reasonably have concluded that there was no reason to
ask for an attorney because he could not afford one and because the police
order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively ap-
prised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
219.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional
rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the
privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the
knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education,
intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a
warning is a clearcut fact.
Id at 468-69 (footnote omitted).
220. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2880 (majority opinion).
222. It should not be acceptable for the police to anticipate certain questions and not
others. There are a number of questions that a suspect might want to ask: Do you have any
witnesses to the crime? Did my friend confess? If I am convicted, will I get a heavier sentence
because I refused to "cooperate" with you? See Kamisar, A Wrong Answer on Police Interroga-
tion, 124 N.J.L.J. 199, 207 (July 27, 1989).
223. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
224. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because going to court, in
common parlance, is understood as going to trial, a suspect could reasonably interpret an "if
and when you go to court" warning as meaning that if he is never taken to court, he "is not
entitled to an attorney at all." Id. (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
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had informed him that they would not provide him with an attorney until he
went to court.225 If Eagan had been told, however, that if he requested an
attorney, then all questioning would stop until counsel was present, the de-
fect in the warning would be cured. The Miranda Court likely would have
endorsed a warning that could easily facilitate a suspect's understanding of
the right against self-incrimination.
B. Judicial Solutions to the Duckworth Dilemma
Law enforcement motives may contribute to the formulation of Miranda
warnings that link the right to counsel to some point after custodial ques-
tioning.226 Given a choice, law enforcement officers likely would prefer to
interrogate a suspect immediately after arrest rather than permit the suspect
to invoke the right to counsel and remain silent.227 Logically, the police,
suspecting that the accused knows more than he admits about a crime,
should pursue the vulnerability of the suspect immediately after arrest, pro-
vided such interrogation is done in constitutional fashion. Thus, the Duck-
worth Court's failure to articulate a clear standard for informing a suspect of
the right against self-incrimination is troublesome both for law enforcement
officials and the lower courts. The Court's hesitation to strike down "if and
when you go to court" warnings opens the door to other misleading police
warnings which are likely to invoke "cooperation" that threatens an ac-
cused's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.228
The Duckworth Court could simply have rejected the use of "if and when
you go to court" language on all waiver forms.229 Without this qualifying
language, Eagan would have been given a straightforward and fully effective
warning of his rights. Such a decree from the Court would send a clear
225. Id.
226. See Kamisar, supra note 222, at 199.
227. Id. The author contends that "this [is] not because the police are more dishonest than
the rest of us.... [but] rather because they are no less human then the rest of us-no less
inclined to further their own interests if given the leeway to do so." Id. Further, it seems
unlikely that a superior would congratulate a police officer for giving such careful and em-
phatic Miranda warnings that a suspect asserted his constitutional rights and refused to engage
in questioning. Id.
228. Id
229. At oral argument in Duckworth, the United States said that federal law enforcement
officials do not use the "if and when you go to court" language in order to avoid "unnecessary
litigation." Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880 n.6 (citation omitted). Further, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has eliminated "if and when you go to court or before a United States Com-
missioner" from its warning form. United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533, 541 & n.8 (7th Cir.
1971) (emphasis omitted). "Apparently the FBI was aware of the judicial controversy sur-
rounding the use of this warning, and to avoid losing cases, abandoned it." Comment, Crimi-
nal Procedure: Miranda Warning and the Right to "Instant Counsel"-A Growing Schism, 29
OKLA. L. REv. 957, 965 (1976).
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message to law enforcement officers that language linking appointment of
counsel with a future event would not be tolerated.
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Williams
v. Twomey, 2 ° which found the identical waiver form used in Duckworth
constitutionally defective, Indiana law enforcement officials were aware that
"if and when you go to court" language was suspect. Yet Indiana refused to
eliminate that language. One explanation for retaining the qualifying lan-
guage is that the "if and when" language confuses suspects, thereby inducing
voluntary cooperation with the police.23 If it is true, or even a likely possi-
bility, that "if and when" language confuses suspects regarding their right to
counsel, the Court should unequivocally condemn the use of "if and when"
language on all waiver forms.
Moreover, the Court's tacit approval of such ambiguous language on
waiver forms will continue to precipitate litigation. The ambiguity inherent
in Duckworth-type warnings will permit police to continue to argue that sus-
pects were "reasonably conveyed" their rights, while allowing suspects lee-
way to contend that the warnings did not adequately inform them of their
fifth amendment rights. The litigation spurred as a by-product of ambigu-
ously worded warnings could be eliminated by requiring specific language on
all waiver and warning forms. By requiring straightforward and standard
warnings, the Supreme Court could eliminate the ongoing semantical debate
surrounding Miranda warnings, while securing the protection the Miranda
decision intended to provide through the development of an objective test for
police warnings.
If the Supreme Court believes that the Miranda rule is too strict, unwork-
able, or prevents effective interrogation, then, alternatively, Miranda should
be explicitly overruled. In its place, a new standard that strikes an appropri-
ate balance between the opportunity for effective police interrogation and
securing an accused's right against self-incrimination should be enunciated.
By gradually eroding the purpose and certainty of the Miranda decision's
bright line test, however, the Supreme Court has left lower courts, and law
enforcement officials, with little guidance regarding the proper procedure for
advising an accused of constitutional rights prior to custodial interrogation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Duckworth v. Eagan, the United States Supreme Court missed an op-
portunity to guide the lower courts in determining what constitutes a "fully
effective equivalent" to Miranda warnings. Rather, the Court added to the
230. 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972).
231. Kamisar, supra note 222, at 199.
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confusion. By holding that an "if and when you go to court" caveat effec-
tively conveys to the indigent his right to appointment of counsel prior to
questioning, the Court misread, or intentionally disregarded, the purpose of
Miranda. As a result, courts are left to their own subjectivity and must sift
through warnings to determine whether, in their totality, those warnings are
reasonable. After Duckworth, warnings need only pass a "reasonableness"
test to protect adequately the accused's right against self-incrimination as
interpreted under Miranda. For these reasons, ambiguously worded pre-in-
terrogation warnings will continue to result in inconsistent application of the
Miranda rule.
The Court should have avoided the subjectiveness of a reasonableness ap-
proach by requiring that all standard waiver forms contain explicit language
of an accused's rights prior to and during custodial interrogation. If the
present members of the Court are not content with the language used in the
Miranda decision, they should explicitly overrule that decision and replace it
with a standard that strikes a more appropriate balance between the con-
cerns of the police in effective interrogation and the suspect's right against
self-incrimination. By reading Miranda to require only that rights must be
reasonably conveyed to the accused, the Court encourages an environment
in which overzealous police officers are allowed to engage in semantic trick-
ery and the accused is provided with technical loopholes.
Jeff L 'Hote
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